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Abstract 
This paper presents results from survey experiments investigating conditions under 
which Britons are willing to pay taxes on polluting activities. People are no more 
willing if revenues are hypothecated for spending on environmental protection, while 
making such taxes more relevant to people—by naming petrol and electricity as 
products to which they will apply—has a modestly negative effect. Public willingness 
increases sharply if people are told that new environmental taxes would be offset by 
cuts to other taxes, but political distrust appears to undermine much of this effect. 
Previous studies have argued that political trust shapes public opinion with respect to 
environmental and many other policies. But this paper provides the first experimental 
evidence suggesting that the relationship is causal, at least for one specific facet: 
cynicism about public officials’ honesty and integrity. The results suggest a need to 
make confidence in the trustworthiness of public officials and their promises more 
central to conceptualisations of political trust. 
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 Natural scientists have no doubt that pollution and resource use by humans are 
transforming the earth in ways that are fundamentally unsustainable (Rockström et al. 
2009). This is all the more tragic given that many such transformations are 
unnecessary: policy experts point to effective, low-cost solutions (e.g., Tietenberg 
2013). Above all, mainstream environmental economics recommends that 
governments attach a price to polluting activities, in order to discourage polluters 
from imposing (externalising) the costs of their polluting activities onto others (Parry, 
Norregaard, and Heine 2012). Correcting the price a polluter must pay to engage in a 
polluting activity using a tax or obligation to surrender a tradable emission permit 
should be a cost-effective means of protecting the environment and maximising social 
well-being (Mirrlees et al. 2011; Rajah and Smith 1994). In practice, where such 
market-based mechanisms have been introduced, their record has generally been 
excellent.1 
Yet they are not actually being introduced very much. The environmental tax 
share of all public revenues in the European Union barely changed between 2006 and 
2013 (Eurostat 2015), for example, and has generally been falling since the mid-1990s 
(Stamatova and Steurer 2013). In the UK specifically, revenue from environmental 
taxes peaked as a share of all total taxes and social contributions in 1998, and has 
changed little since 2001 (Office for National Statistics 2015). Given the growing 
scientific consensus about the seriousness of many environmental problems, why are 
																																																								
1 The U.S. SO2 trading scheme and British Columbia’s carbon tax are two examples of 
market-based measures for environmental protection that have proven extremely effective 
(Elgie and McClay 2013; Schmalensee and Stavins 2013). The European Union’s Emissions 
Trading System is sometimes held up as evidence of ineffectiveness, but that scheme’s failure 
to attach a meaningful price to greenhouse gas emissions was due to the unanticipated 
economic contraction of recent years, and the resulting surplus of allowances. Overall the EU 
has been achieving substantial greenhouse gas emission reductions (European Environment 
Agency 2015). 
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governments making so little use of market-based instruments for environmental 
protection? 
One major reason is public scepticism, if not outright hostility. Public 
opposition has killed efforts to introduce market-based mechanisms in places such as 
Australia (Baird 2014), Canada (Harrison 2012), and Switzerland (Maclucas 2015; 
Thalmann 2004).2 We therefore need to know more about the sources of public 
opinion with respect to environmental protection generally, and how to present 
problems and solutions such that public opinion will allow states to take action 
(Keohane 2015: 24; see also Bernauer 2013; Cao, Milner, Prakash, and Ward 2014). 
This paper aims to expand our understanding of conditions under which people are 
less hostile, and more open, to proposals for environmental protection using the 
market-based mechanism that is environmental taxation. The results in the paper 
should be of interest not only to scholars of environmental politics and public opinion, 
but also to policymakers and advocates seeking to foster public support. 
 The headline result of the experiments presented here is that offsetting new 
green taxes with cuts to other taxes substantially increases public support, but framing 
revenue neutrality as merely a government promise rather than a fact appears to 
undermine much of the positive effect of offsetting.3 Stating that the new green tax 
revenues are to be spent on the environment has no impact on support. Making the 
increased taxation more real to people by pointing out that it would apply to goods 
and services they purchase also has no effect, unless reference is made to the taxation 
																																																								
2 Some governmental reluctance to engage in better environmental protection is clearly due to 
lobbying by firms with an interest in externalizing their environmental costs (Farrell 2016); 
yet businesses are also sometimes open to the introduction of new environmental policies (see 
e.g., Pulver 2007). 
3 This paper uses “green taxes” and “environmental taxes” interchangeably. 
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of petrol and electricity specifically, in which case support declines. And these effects 
do not differ much even for people with quite different baseline attitudes. 
 The impact of framing revenue-neutrality as a promise rather than a fact 
strongly supports prior claims, based on observational data, that political distrust is an 
important reason for people’s scepticism of market-based measures for environmental 
protection. Green tax increases are typically implemented in tandem with offsetting 
tax reductions elsewhere (Tietenberg 2013), often with the objective of winning 
public acceptance, and the results here validate that revenue neutrality should indeed 
be a powerful means of building support. But majorities of citizens in all countries do 
not to believe that politicians keep their promises (Naurin 2011), and there appears to 
be widespread scepticism that revenue-neutrality will materialise in practice. As such, 
convincing the public to trust that governments will keep their promises on revenue-
neutrality is a key challenge for environmental policymakers and advocates; 
seemingly, until voters are convinced, they will remain hostile. 
 More broadly, this study—the first to use experimental data in testing for a 
causal relationship between political trust and policy attitudes—suggests a need for a 
change of emphasis in definitions of political trust. Prior research has generally 
considered political trust to be about people’s satisfaction with their governments’ 
overall performance (e.g., Hetherington 2005; Hetherington and Husser 2012; 
Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Rudolph 2009; Rudolph and Evans 2005). In 
contrast, the present study isolates cynicism—perceptions of a lack of honesty and 
integrity on the part of public officials—and finds that this sentiment by itself 
exercises considerable influence on people’s attitudes. Whether or not they are happy 
about government performance, then, expectations about whether politicians will keep 
their promises are clearly an important determinant of people’s policy preferences. 
 5 
 
The Policy and Politics of Environmental Taxation 
The European Union defines environmental taxes as those “whose base is a 
physical unit (for example, a litre of petrol or a passenger flight) that has a proven 
negative impact on the environment” (ONS 2015). By this definition, environmental 
taxes in the UK summed to £44.6 billion in 2014, representing 7.5% of all public 
revenue from taxes and social contributions, with households paying an average of 
£765 each for environmental taxes in 2012 (ibid.).4 Britain is fairly typical in the 
OECD in terms of the environmental tax share of all public revenues (see Parry, 
Norregaard, and Heine 2012: 103, citing data from OECD 2010). 
What would it take to increase this share? Prior studies have identified a 
variety of macro-level conditions shaping countries’ use of environmental taxes—
Ward and Cao (2012) for example emphasise the power of the energy-producing 
sector. Yet there is widespread agreement that public opinion also influences 
environmental policy, and therefore that social scientists need to better understand 
that influence (see Bernauer 2013; Cao, Milner, Prakash and Ward 2014). Politically, 
the introduction of any new tax presumes a certain measure of public “support, 
consensus, or even merely passive tolerance” (Pearson 1995: 358). Unfortunately, 
taxes remain an unpopular way of addressing environmental problems, even if they 
are a relatively popular kind of tax (Jagers and Hammar 2009). Environmental taxes 
are unpopular because all taxes are unpopular (Chartered Institute of Taxation (2009, 
cited in Smith 2009). 
There is a rapidly expanding research literature on environmental attitudes 
generally. A number of works in sociology, for example, have addressed the 																																																								
4 Such taxes include the UK’s climate change levy, aggregates levy, landfill tax, EU 
emissions trading scheme, carbon reduction commitment, and carbon price floor (ONS 2015). 
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demographic correlates of environmental concern, defined as “concern about 
environmental problems and support for environmental protection” (Dunlap and York 
2008). Such studies have focused largely on the importance of income (at both the 
national and individual/household levels), as well as underlying general values (e.g., 
Fairbrother 2013; Shwom, Bidwell, Dan, and Dietz 2010). Beyond the demographic 
characteristics of individuals that correlate with different kinds of environmental 
attitudes, though, we still know little about the substance of the beliefs that lead 
people to hold the attitudes and preferences they do. 
This article builds on a number of prior studies of environmental attitudes 
generally that have made good use of questions about taxation. Survey questions 
about a respondent’s “willingness” to pay taxes admittedly leave somewhat implicit 
the scenario in question, but most respondents would seem likely to understand that 
the question is about a potential tax policy change, not about whether the respondent 
will choose individually to cheat on his/her taxes. As such, this is a different issue 
than tax compliance (on which see for example Bodea and LeBas 2016). Questions 
about taxation are also useful insofar as they interrogate people’s valuation of 
environmental protection at some cost (Cao, Milner, Prakash, and Ward 2014: 302). 
In the absence of any trade-off, supporting environmental protection would seem a 
given. What is more telling is whether people care enough about environmental 
quality such that they are willing to pay a price for it. 
 
Public Support for Environmental Taxes 
Aside from studies of how preferences differ according to background 
demographic and attitudinal characteristics, a small number of previous studies have 
sought to illuminate conditions under which people are more supportive of 
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environmental taxes (Dresner, Dunne, Clinch, and Beuermann 2006;  Hsu, Walters, 
and Purgas 2008; Jagers and Hammar 2009; Hammar and Jagers 2006; Kallbekkenn 
and Sælen 2011). Much of what we currently know also comes from public opinion 
polls little connected to the academic research literature, such as those conducted by a 
self-styled “Green Fiscal Commission” (GFC) in Britain in the late 2000s. 
Aside from prior empirical findings, some expectations can be derived 
theoretically.5 The literature on public attitudes towards taxes in general suggests that 
people are at least partly rational (Campbell 2009), in the basic sense that they seek to 
reduce the tax burden they have to pay, while seeking public benefits. With respect to 
the environment, then, while people are willing to pay a price for tackling problems 
like climate change (Tingley and Tomz 2014), they are nonetheless sensitive to the 
costs (Bechtel and Scheve 2013). At the same time, however, the public’s fiscal 
preferences are also far from rational, in that they are contradictory. As Schenk (2011: 
288) puts it: “Voters [send] conflicting signals to their representatives: they want 
programs but they do not want to pay for them.” McCaffery and Baron (2006: 132) 
agree: “The average person suffers from a wide range of heuristics and biases in 
thinking about tax and public finance, leading to inconsistent judgment and decision 
making.” Most importantly, people appear not to attach much weight to the benefits 
that potential new tax revenues might provide. Environmental tax policy preferences 
should therefore reflect the relative saliences of the direct costs and benefits that 
different proposals represent to survey respondents. Where people are made to think 
to think more about the costs to themselves, or made to think that those costs will be 
greater, their acceptance of environmental taxation should be lower. Conversely, 
																																																								
5 In general, environmental research in political science has thus far developed in a fairly 
atheoretical way (Cao, Milner, Prakash and Ward 2014). 
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people should be more accepting of tax proposals if made to think about ways in 
which such proposals might provide them with clear benefits.6 
From this basic theoretical premise, and in light of what empirical literature 
there is on attitudes towards environmental taxes, I derive five hypotheses in the 
remainder of this section. 
First, people should be more accepting of new environmental taxes if those 
taxes are offset with reductions to other taxes, insofar as people should perceive 
substantially lower net costs to themselves than they would in the absence of such 
offsetting. Consistent with this expectation, the Green Fiscal Commission (2007) 
found much stronger support for revenue-neutral than for revenue-increasing green 
taxes. Another study found that Americans’ support for carbon taxes rose when it was 
tied to offsetting reductions in income tax (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2014; see also 
Kaplowitz and McCright 2015). Still, questions remain about the robustness of this 
relationship, particularly as many people appear not to believe or understand that a 
revenue-neutral tax shift can be beneficial for the environment (Dresner, Dunne, 
Clinch, and Beuermann 2006; Kallbekkenn and Sælen 2011). 
 
Hypothesis 1: Offsetting environmental tax increases with tax cuts elsewhere will 
increase willingness to pay. 
 
																																																								
6 This general theory of public attitudes to taxation derives from basic findings in behavioural 
economics. In this regard, Schenk (2011: 264) refers to the influential work of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) in summarising that: 
Individuals are often biased in that they rely too heavily on information that 
is readily available or prominent, ignoring information that they do not see as 
often or as readily or that is in the background. ... Thus, the salience 
(prominence) of an object or idea is one factor that may cause the use of an 
availability heuristic to affect behavior. 
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Second, people may not think that environmental taxes will cost them much 
money, insofar as they do not actually think of themselves as “polluters.” This is 
because people “externalise responsibility” a great deal (e.g., Lorenzoni, Nicholson-
Coleb, and Whitmarsh 2007). They seek to avoid blame for contributing to 
environmental problems, ascribe responsibility instead to corporations and 
governments, and “do not accept that the main responsibility for taking action against 
climate change lies with individuals and families” (Gough 2011). It may then be the 
case that respondents respond more hostilely to proposals for environmental taxation 
the more they are confronted with suggestions that their own lifestyles have 
environmental impacts—not just because they resent being framed as “polluters” but 
also because they understand that they should then expect to pay more in tax. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Drawing people’s attention to the fact that environmental tax increases 
will apply to their consumption and spending will reduce willingness to pay. 
 
 Third, naming specific examples of goods that would be covered by potential 
new green taxes might make the likely costs of such taxes even more salient to 
people, and therefore objectionable. Consistent with this suggestion, some previous 
studies have found that support for environmental taxes is particularly low where the 
tax will apply specifically to domestic energy and vehicle fuels (Green Fiscal 
Commission 2009; Hsu 2010; Jagers and Hammar 2009). In two U.S. states, for 
example, Shwom, Bidwell, Dan, and Dietz (2010) found that taxes on petrol were the 
least popular environmental policy instrument, by far. In the case of the UK, the 
taxation of energy specifically is quite heavy (second highest in the EU), with most of 
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the tax burden falling on households (Stamatova and Steurer 2012).7 Yet transport 
fuels and home energy are generally quite polluting, and so are likely candidates for 
additional taxation. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Naming specific goods to which new environmental tax increases 
would apply, such as petrol and electricity, will reduce people’s willingness to pay. 
 
Fourth, people should be more accepting if their attention is drawn to ways in 
which the money they pay out in taxes is nonetheless put to beneficial purposes. The 
literature suggests in particular that many people perceive environmental taxation as 
more legitimate if the associated revenues are also spent on the environment, possibly 
because they do not understand that a tax can be beneficial through its incentive 
effects. In the case of an energy tax change in Germany, for example, some members 
of the public specifically “demanded that energy taxes be used to promote energy 
savings and subsidize public transport” (Kohlhaus and Meyer 2005: 141, quoted in 
Harrison 2010: 519-20). Many studies therefore find “that earmarking the revenues 
from environmental taxes for environmental purposes increases their popularity” 
(Kallbekkenn and Sælen 2011: 2967—see for example the Green Fiscal Commission 
2007; Kaplowitz and McCright 2015).8 From a policy perspective, both the Chartered 
Institute of Taxation (2009, cited in Smith 2009) and the House of Commons 
																																																								
7 Mirrlees et al. (2012: 669) note that: “taxation of gasoline and diesel is the most substantial 
excise tax in the United Kingdom, accounting for 5 percent of all tax revenue.” 
8 In one survey in 2007, the Green Fiscal Commission asked a nationally representative 
sample of respondents: “In principle, do you think you would support or oppose green taxes?” 
51% reported support, and 32% opposition. They then asked: “What if there was a guarantee 
that the money generated by the extra tax was spent directly on projects that would help to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions—for example, the money could be used to subsidise public 
transport or home insulation. In principle, would you support or oppose an increase in green 
taxes if the money was spent in this way?” 73% reported support, and only 17% opposition. 
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Environmental Audit Committee (2011) argue that hypothecating revenues for 
spending on environmental protection should increase public support. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Hypothecating the revenues from increased environmental taxes for 
spending on environmental protection will increase willingness to pay. 
 
Finally, if people’s acceptance depends on whether new environmental taxes 
are revenue-neutral and/or on how revenues are spent, people may be hostile to 
proposals for new environmental taxes if that they do not believe governments will 
actually introduce the new taxes as promised—cutting other taxes and/or spending 
new revenues on the environment (Hammar and Jagers 2006; Hsu, Walters, and 
Purgas 2008). As the Chartered Institute of Taxation (quoted in Smith, 2009) notes, 
“people do not trust governments to implement the environmental taxes in a fiscally 
neutral way.” Instead, people regard taxes on energy for example as “stealth taxes”: 
an Ipsos MORI poll in 2008 found for example that 59% of Britons agreed that 
“climate change is being used by the Government as an excuse to raise taxes” (Ipsos 
MORI 2010: 67). And Harrison (2012: 393) notes that even in the case of British 
Columbia—where a carbon tax has proven politically sustainable—“voters simply did 
not believe the government’s reassurances that the tax was revenue neutral” (see also 
Shwom, Bidwell, Dan, and Dietz 2010: 480). Respondents could then distrust that 
governments will fulfil their promises to make new green taxes revenue-neutral 
and/or to use the revenues they generate specifically for spending on environmental 
protection. 
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Hypothesis 5a: Framing the dedication of revenues from environmental taxes to 
spending on environmental protection as a government promise will reduce 
willingness to pay relative to framing it as a fact. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Framing revenue-neutral offsetting as a government promise will 
reduce willingness to pay relative to framing it as a fact. 
 
In testing these last two hypotheses, this study builds on prior research arguing 
that trust, including particularly political trust, shapes support for environmental 
protection (e.g., Duit 2010; Hammar and Jagers 2006; Harring 2013; Konisky, Milyo, 
and Richardson 2008; Lubell 2002; Meyer and Liebe 2010; Rudolph and Evans 
2005).9 Previous studies have all, however, all been based on observational data. This 
limitation reflects that it is clearly not possible to randomly assign subjects to 
different levels of political trust, in the sense of perceptions of whether the 
government “is producing outcomes consistent with their expectations... a pragmatic 
running tally of how people think the government is doing at a given point in time,” to 
quote Hetherington’s (2005: 9) influential definition. But the experiment here 
nevertheless investigates the impact of political distrust, by randomly assigning 
subjects to conditions under which political trust explicitly is or is not relevant. In 
some scenarios a key policy feature is presented as a government “promise,” meaning 
that respondents’ preferences should reflect their expectations about the probability 
that the people running the government will fulfil their promises. In other scenarios, 
the same feature is presented simply as a fact, making such expectations irrelevant. 
																																																								
9 It also responds to Hetherington and Husser’s (2012: 323) call for more research on the 
relationship between political trust and public preferences with respect to environmental 
policy. 
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Prior observational research has typically measured political trust using one or 
more broad questions about respondents’ overall confidence or trust in parliament, 
politicians, etc. and/or about how often they think the government “does what is 
right” (e.g., Hetherington and Rudolph 2008; McLaren 2011; Rudolph 2009; Rudolph 
and Evans 2005). The experiment here, in contrast, isolates and tests the specific 
impact of cynicism—“the integrity dimension of political trust” (Dancey 2012: 412). 
This is a somewhat different conception of than is typical in the literature, with a 
different emphasis than Hetherington’s influential performance-focused view. The 
conception here instead focuses on people’s expectations about honesty and promise-
keeping (e.g., Levi and Stoker 2000; Dalton 2005), and their beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of government promises.10 This perspective echoes earlier work 
explicitly equating political distrust to cynicism (e.g., Miller 1974), and reflects that a 
decision to trust presumes “the expectation that [a] trustee will do X, framed in terms 
of a probability” (Ermisch, Gambetta, Laurie, Siedler, and Uhrig 2009). 
The analyses below contrast how people’s willingness to pay new 
environmental taxes depends both on their cynicism as measured using baseline 
questions about their generic views of “the people running the government” and as 
measured by the effect of framing policy features as government promises. These 
analyses contextualise prior studies’ findings about the consequences of political trust 
and test whether political cynicism is indeed, as some have it, “neither deeply felt nor 
behaviorally potent” (Citrin and Muste 1999: 469, quoted in Dancey 2012: 413). 
 																																																								
10 Levi and Stoker (2000: 498) note that survey research based on the general trust questions 
above “leaves trustworthiness undefined, open to the interpretation of the potential truster.” 
Such an approach may have its merits, but it clearly does not help specify what aspects of 
political trust operate to influence people’s policy attitudes. Hetherington (2005: 16) also 
acknowledges considerable “slippage between the concept of political trust and the survey 
items used to measure it.” 
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Models presented below also investigate how the impacts of the randomly 
assigned treatments differ across respondents with a variety of characteristics that 
might shape their responses to the treatments. These characteristics are: belief versus 
scepticism in climate science; left versus right/liberal political views; political 
cynicism (as discussed above); interest in politics (a characteristic closely related to 
political dis/trust); and political party identification (Conservative versus Labour). 
First, Britons who do not believe in the seriousness of environmental problems might 
well fail to respond to any attempts to shift their willingness to pay new green taxes, 
insofar as they may lack a baseline reason to support efforts for protection. Second, 
people subscribing to right-of-centre political views may resent the state regulatory 
intervention embodied by any kind of taxation, and so they too could be less sensitive 
to efforts for increasing their willingness to pay.11 Third, people with low levels of 
baseline political cynicism as captured by standard attitudinal measures should be less 
bothered by suggestions that appealing features of green tax proposals are just 
government “promises”; testing whether this is indeed the case will help assess the 
value of those measures. Fourth, people with little interest in politics would appear 
least likely to be knowledgeable about public policy, and so to appreciate how green 
taxes can incentivise behaviour change; they might therefore respond differently to 
key features of proposals new green taxes. Fifth, sympathisers of the main opposition 
political party might respond differently to some treatments, particularly as they may 
be less trusting in the politicians making up the current government. 
 
																																																								
11 Ward and Cao (2012) have found a significant left–right gradient in the composition of 
legislatures adopting more green taxes, validating arguments that environmental protection is 
more a concern of the political left than the right. 
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Research Design, Data, and Analytical Methods 
Social scientists are making increasing use of survey experiments to 
understand the public’s attitudes towards environmental degradation and protection 
(e.g., Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Tingley and Tomz 
2014; Kaplowitz and McCright 2015). I designed an experiment in which each 
respondent to a nationally representative survey received one of several different 
versions of a commonly used opinion question about support for environmental 
protection. The question specifically investigated support for environmental 
protection in the form of taxation, the base version reading: “How willing would you 
be to pay higher taxes in order to protect the environment? Not at all willing, not very 
willing, fairly willing, or very willing?” The International Social Survey Programme 
has previously used this question, across multiple waves, and a question similar to it 
has also been included in the World Values Surveys/European Values Studies.12 
Respondents were randomly assigned to five treatments in ten different 
combinations—see Table 1 below (and also Appendix A, for the complete wordings 
of the ten different versions of the question). The five experiments running 
simultaneously investigated the impact on people’s responses of: 
1. Stating that new environmental taxes would be offset by cuts to other taxes. 
(According to hypothesis 1, offsetting should increase support.) 
2. Emphasising that respondents themselves are polluters, specifically as 
consumers, with the implication that new environmental taxes would affect the 
cost of things they buy. (According to Hypothesis 2, making the personal costs 
of environmental taxes more salient should reduce support.) 																																																								
12 The wording in the ISSP was very slightly different: “How willing would you be to pay 
much higher taxes in order to protect the environment?” The WVS/EVS question was: “I 
would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental 
pollution.” 
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3. Pointing out two specific products to which new environmental taxes would 
apply (petrol and electricity), and suggesting the prices of these already 
heavily taxed products would rise. (According to Hypothesis 3, taxing petrol 
and electricity specifically should reduce support.) 
4. Stating that new revenues from environmental taxes would be spent on 
(unspecified) programmes for environmental protection. (According to 
hypothesis 4, hypothecating should increase support.) 
5. Drawing respondents’ attention to the possibility of the government not doing 
what it says, in having only “promised” to spend the tax revenue on the 
environment and offset the new taxes. (According to hypothesis 5a, only 
promising hypothecation should reduce support compared to it being a fact. 
According to hypothesis 5b, only promising to offset new taxes should reduce 
support compared to it being a fact.) 
 
The experiment was conducted as part of the UK Understanding Society 
Innovation Panel (IP), a longitudinal survey representative of households in Britain 
(excluding Northern Ireland and north of the Caledonian Canal). The first wave of the 
Innovation Panel ran in 2008, and since then participants have been re-interviewed 
annually. The sample for the seventh, 2014, wave (IP7) consisted of households from 
the original 2008 sample as well as from refreshment samples added in 2011 and 
2014. The data can be obtained from the UK Data Service.13 IP7 generated interviews 
with 2413 individual respondents, 2236 of whom provided valid responses to one of 																																																								
13 Each wave of the IP entails both a household interview (conducted with one member of the 
household) and separate individual interviews with every member of the household (covering 
topics such as demographics, religion, health, employment, education, and politics). The 
household bill-payer or his/her spouse/partner (or another appropriate person) completes the 
household questionnaire, which includes an enumeration of all household members. Only 
household members aged 16 and over are interviewed in full, and received the environmental 
taxation experiment. 
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the ten questions about environmental taxes.14 The allocation into treatment groups 
was done at the household level, so all eligible adults in a household received the 
same treatment/question.15 
As explained earlier, the analyses below also take advantage of other baseline 
data collected as part of the Innovation Panel. In particular, I investigate how the 
effects of the randomly assigned treatments may vary according to a number of non-
experimentally manipulated, background attitudinal characteristics. 
As a measure of people’s perceptions of the seriousness of environmental 
problems generally, I use an index comprising two questions about past and future 
climate change specifically: 
• “As far as you know, would you say that average temperatures around the 
world have been higher in the last three years than before that, lower, or 
about the same?” (AVTEMP) 
• “Do you believe that people in the UK will be affected by climate change 
in the next 30 years?” (OPECL30) 
I take a response of “higher” to AVTEMP as stronger belief in climate change, since 
the scientific community agrees that the planet has been warming, with 15 of the 
																																																								
14 There were 101 don’t knows, refusals, and missing. For 76 respondents, another household 
member provided information about the respondent, rather than the respondent him/herself; 
these proxy interviews are excluded from the analyses. Of the 2337 non-proxy interviews, 
1581 were conducted face-to-face, 4 by telephone, and 752 online. The 2413 respondents 
were members of 1427 different households; in a total of 58 households, 87 respondents 
completed the individual questionnaire, but nobody completed the household questionnaire, 
such that some household-level variables are missing. There were 657 households with a 
single respondent to the individual questionnaire, 612 with two, 112 with three, 35 with four, 
ten with five, and one with six. 
15 The IP is specifically focused on experimental tests of survey procedures and the content of 
the questionnaire. Brief descriptions of all the IP7 methodological experiments and their 
results are available from: www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/research/publications/working-
paper/understanding-society/2015-03.pdf. Further methodological details are available at 
www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/d/204/6849_ip_waves1-7_user_manual_June_2015.pdf and 
www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/d/196/IP7_TechReport_v4.pdf (the latter also including 
information about response rates). 
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hottest 16 years on record occurring since 2001 (Bolden and Sullivan 2016; Karl et al. 
2015). Goodman-Kruskal’s G (a measure of association between two ordinal 
variables) for this index is 0.60), indicating an acceptably strong association between 
the two items. Disbelief in climate change is rare (20%). 
Second, I measure left as opposed to right/liberal political views with an index 
comprising two questions JOBS and ADQHOUS about economic policy (G = 0.45): 
• “Do you think the government should or should not see to it that every 
person has a job and a good standard of living?” 
• “Some people feel the government should see to it that all people have 
adequate housing, while others feel each person should provide for his or 
her own housing. Which comes closest to how you feel about this?” 
Since these two questions address support for the state’s active intervention in 
the economy, I also refer to them as measuring economic liberalism (in the European 
rather than American sense). This variable’s usefulness as a measure of left political 
ideology is demonstrated by its capturing meaningful partisan differences: its mean 
score for Conservative party sympathisers is 0.45, 0.64 for Liberal Democrats, and 
0.77 for Labour.16 Left ideology is prevalent by this measure—almost half of 
Conservatives subscribe to it—and it maps on well to the parties’ relative placements 
on an overall left-right index, judging by their platforms.17 
Third, background political cynicism is measured as an index comprising 
answers to two questions that have long been used to measure generic political 
distrust (G = 0.52; see Levi and Stoker 2000; Miller 1974): 
																																																								
16 I do not examine party identification further in the analyses below because it is missing for 
a large number of respondents. 
17 See the Manifesto Project of Volkens et al. (2015), who scored Labour -1.50, the LibDems 
4.66, and the Conservatives 17.54 in 2010 (http://manifesto-project.wzb.eu). 
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• “Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are 
corrupt, not very many are, hardly any of them are corrupt, or do you not 
have an opinion?” (DCRKD) 
• “Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are 
smart people, or do you think that quite a few of them don’t seem to know 
what they are doing, or do you not have an opinion on that?” (LDSMRT, 
reverse-coded) 
Cynicism by these measures is widespread, with a mean score of 0.71—consistent for 
example with an Ipsos MORI poll of British adults in 2009 that found only 13% 
generally trusted politicians to tell the truth, the lowest proportion out of 16 types of 
people (Ipsos MORI 2010). Political cynicism is only minimally correlated with 
political ideology (G = 0.09). 
Fourth, interest in politics, and potentially thereby people’s understanding of 
policymaking, is captured by VOTE6 (with four ordered response options): 
• “How interested would you say you are in politics?”18 
Finally, demographic covariates are education (highest qualification), age in 
years (less the sample minimum of 16), rural as opposed to urban residence, gender 
(female is the reference category), and income (FIHHMNGRS_DV, gross household 
income in the month prior to the interview, divided both by 1000 and by the square 
root of the number of household members). Respondents were also asked to name the 
political party to which they feel closest. Many people did not identify a party, 
however, with only the Conservatives and Labour attracting more than just a few 																																																								
18 A number of unrelated experiments affected how these questions were asked. In the cases 
of LDSMRT, LDCRKD, AVTEMP, JOBS, and ADQHOUS, in each case respondents were 
randomly assigned to one of four versions of each question (two for AVTEMP). I ignore the 
distinctions in the analyses below. The random assignment to different wordings was done 
separately for each question, and the effects of the differences in wording were not large for 
any of these questions. 
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dozen sympathisers, so I limit the analysis of partisanship to just these two. At the 
time of the data collection, the Conservative Party was leading a coalition 
government, while Labour was the official opposition. Appendix B presents 
descriptive statistics for all these variables. 
I present results below in the form of ordinal probit models fitted using the R 
package MCMCglmm (Hadfield 2010). Estimation was Bayesian, with flat priors. 
The probability of observing an outcome in category k is: Pr(y=k) = FN(γk|wθ, σe2) − 
FN(γk+1|wθ, σe2) , where FN is the Normal distribution function, and σe2 is fixed at 1. 
The γ’s are cutpoints (with one γ equal to zero); w consists of fixed and random 
effects design matrices X and Z; and θ comprises vectors of regression coefficients β 
and random intercepts u. Because some households included multiple respondents to 
the individual survey (and all members of each household received the same treatment 
for the experiment), I include a random intercept for households in each model. This 
had the effect of slightly widening the credible intervals for the coefficient estimates. 
Given the Bayesian estimation of the models, instead of frequentist p values, the 
tables with the fitted models below include the modelled probability that the sign of 
each estimated beta coefficient was the opposite of the mean value. (The coefficient 
estimates presented are posterior means.) This Bayesian approach allows for more 
straightforward inferences and quantification of uncertainty, estimating as it does the 
probability of a positive or negative relationship given the data, not the probability of 
the data given a null hypothesis which may or may not be true (see e.g., Gill 1999). 
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Results 
 
First, Table 1 presents models of willingness to pay as a function of only 
observational data. These models investigate the demographic and attitudinal 
correlates of being willing to pay taxes to protect the environment. Model 1 includes 
only demographics—education, income, gender, age, and a dummy variable for rural 
rather than urban residence. Model 2 includes those demographics, plus a number of 
attitudinal covariates: belief in climate change, left ideology (versus economic 
liberalism), political cynicism, and interest in politics. 
 Model 1 shows that higher- versus lower-income earners are no different in 
their willingness, and nor are rural versus urban residents, or older rather than 
younger Britons. But men and women, and even more so education groups, differ 
significantly: women are more willing to pay to protect the environment, and so are 
more educated people. 
Adding attitudinal covariates makes little differences to these demographic 
relationships.19 Model 2 shows that, not surprisingly, respondents who believe in 
climate change are more willing to pay taxes. The politically cynical are less willing, 
and those with left political ideologies are more so (though there is an 8% chance they 
are less so). Ceteris paribus, those more interested in politics are also more willing. 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
19 I do not include party identification in Model 2, given its very high level of missingness, 
but it appears in models presented below. 
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Table 1: Models with Observational Data Only 
Model 1 2 
Fixed Effects   
Highest qualification:   
Other higher degree -0.41** 
(0.00) 
-0.31** 
(0.00) 
A-level or equivalent -0.43** 
(0.00) 
-0.27** 
(0.00) 
GCSE or equivalent -0.75** 
(0.00) 
-0.55** 
(0.00) 
Other -0.77** 
(0.00) 
-0.52** 
(0.00) 
None -0.77** 
(0.00) 
-0.61** 
(0.00) 
Income 0.02 
(0.31) 
0.01 
(0.43) 
Rural -0.10 
(0.16) 
-0.10 
(0.13) 
Male -0.15* 
(0.01) 
-0.18** 
(0.00) 
Age  0.00 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.10) 
Belief in Climate Change  1.23** 
(0.00) 
Left Ideology   0.13 
(0.08) 
Political Cynicism  -0.40** 
(0.00) 
Interest in Politics  0.13** 
(0.00) 
(Intercept) 1.55** 
(0.00) 
0.46* 
(0.02) 
SD of the Random Effects   
Households 0.94 0.77 
Cutpoints   
1 1.02 1.00 
2 2.62 2.55 
N (households, individuals) 1100, 1560 1100, 1560 
Note: Random effects are presented on the standard deviation 
scale. Figures in parentheses are the modelled probabilities of 
the parameter having the opposite sign; coefficients are marked 
with * if the probability is less than 0.05, ** if less than 0.01. 
The reference category for highest qualification is possession of 
a degree. 
 
Next, Table 2 presents the results of the five experiments, in the form of the 
raw percentages of respondents who provided each of the four possible answers, 
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under ten different combinations of the five experimental conditions. Table 2 shows 
that, among respondents who received the base version of the question (A), about a 
third provided each of the three less supportive responses, and only a small number 
(5%) gave the most supportive response (“very willing”). The distribution of 
responses varied substantially across the other nine scenarios, indicating that 
differences in question wording made a meaningful difference.20 
 
Table 2: Raw Percentages of Each Response, by Combination of Conditions 
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 Not at 
all 
willing 
(%) 
Not 
very 
willing 
(%) 
Fairly 
willing 
(%) 
Very 
willing 
(%) 
Valid 
N 
A      29 33 33 5 234 
B X     7 19 44 30 221 
C  X    25 30 39 6 198 
D X X    10 16 44 30 222 
E  X X   28 44 25 3 214 
F X X X   16 20 43 21 219 
G    X  25 36 35 4 238 
H X   X  14 21 44 22 218 
I    X X 27 29 37 6 235 
J X   X X 23 24 38 15 237 
Raw percentages of respondents giving each answer, depending on the combination of 
treatments they were assigned. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the experiments as analysed using multilevel 
models (such models being appropriate given the nesting of respondents within 
households). The first model in Table 3, with only dummies for the various 
experimental treatments on the right-hand side, presents the core findings of this 
paper.21 First, revenue-neutrality is a strong means of increasing acceptance of 																																																								
20 Appendix E presents means and standard deviations by treatment group for each variable 
other than the outcome and the treatment indicators. Mutz and Pemantle (2015) do not 
recommend tests of balance across groups. A cursory glance at Table E1 suggests only trivial 
differences among the groups. 
21 Appendix C presents a model with each of nine treatment conditions entered simply as a 
dummy variables relative to the base category. The models in Table 3 could also have 
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environmental taxes: the coefficient on Offset is large. People are much more willing 
to pay if new environmental taxes are offset with tax cuts elsewhere. Hypothesis 1 is 
therefore supported. 
Second, making the likely costs of increased environmental taxation more 
salient to respondents, by framing respondents themselves as polluters, makes no 
notable difference. Hypothesis 2 is therefore not supported. Third, however, naming 
petrol and electricity specifically as goods that would be subject to the hypothetical 
new tax substantially undermines support. Hypothesis 3 is therefore supported. 
Fourth, and somewhat surprisingly, the evidence here suggests people are not 
more enthusiastic if green tax revenue is “Spent” on the environment. If anything, 
people are marginally less willing to pay new environmental taxes, if told that the 
revenues will also be spent specifically on programmes for environmental protection. 
Hypothesis 4 is therefore not supported. 
Fifth, it seems few people trust government promises. The coefficient on 
“Promise” is not statistically significant by itself, but that is because (as per the 
previous paragraph) people appear not to want the revenues from green taxes to be 
spent on the environment. They therefore are not concerned about the risk of 
governments failing to follow through on this promise, and Hypothesis 5a is not 
supported. People do, however, care about how much tax they pay. Where the 
government’s promise is not only to spend revenues on the environment, but also to 
offset new green taxes, then people have reason to worry about the risk of promised 
outcomes never materialising. The coefficient on the interaction effect “Offset : 
Promised”, capturing how the effect of Offset changes if it is a government promise 
rather than a fait accompli, is negative and significant. Hypothesis 5b is therefore 																																																																																																																																																														
included interactions between Offset and other randomly assigned treatments, but I 
investigated and found that no such effects were statistically or substantively significant. 
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Table 3: Models including Randomly Assigned Treatments 
Model 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Fixed Effects       
Offset 0.95** 
(0.00) 
1.06** 
(0.00) 
0.96** 
(0.00) 
0.87** 
(0.00) 
0.94** 
(0.00) 
0.98** 
(0.00) 
Things You Buy 0.07 
(0.21) 
0.50* 
(0.05) 
0.38* 
(0.01) 
-0.17 
(0.24) 
0.16 
(0.15) 
-0.01 
(0.49) 
Petrol and Electricity -0.32** 
(0.00) 
-0.42 
(0.07) 
-0.47** 
(0.00) 
-0.14 
(0.28) 
-0.42** 
(0.00) 
-0.21 
(0.13) 
Spent -0.13 
(0.08) 
0.21 
(0.24) 
0.01 
(0.49) 
0.16 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(0.43) 
-0.18 
(0.17) 
Promised 0.16 
(0.09) 
0.27 
(0.22) 
-0.10 
(0.34) 
0.01 
(0.48) 
0.19 
(0.17) 
0.23 
(0.19) 
Offset : Promised -0.62** 
(0.00) 
-0.85* 
(0.03) 
-0.77** 
(0.00) 
-0.53 
(0.09) 
-0.76** 
(0.00) 
-0.80** 
(0.00) 
Belief in Climate Change  1.69** 
(0.00)    
 
Left Ideology   0.37* (0.02)   
 
Political Cynicism    -0.64** (0.01)  
 
Interest in Politics     0.28** (0.00) 
 
Conservative (v. Labour)      -0.21 (0.15) 
: Offset  -0.22 
(0.19) 
0.04 
(0.40) 
0.15 
(0.24) 
-0.01 
(0.44) 
-0.05 
(0.40) 
: Things You Buy  -0.55 
(0.06) 
-0.50* 
(0.02) 
0.43 
(0.08) 
-0.09 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.45) 
: Petrol and 
Electricity 
 0.19 
(0.29) 
0.23 
(0.16) 
-0.33 
(0.15) 
0.09 
(0.16) 
-0.03 
(0.46) 
: Spent  -0.40 
(0.13) 
-0.23 
(0.16) 
-0.41 
(0.12) 
-0.14 
(0.08) 
0.25 
(0.18) 
: Promised  -0.08 
(0.43) 
0.45 
(0.08) 
0.24 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(0.45) 
-0.47 
(0.08) 
: Offset : Promised  0.28 
(0.30) 
0.18 
(0.33) 
-0.20 
(0.35) 
0.11 
(0.23) 
0.36 
(0.20) 
(Intercept) 0.70** 
(0.00) 
-0.58** 
(0.00) 
0.47** 
(0.00) 
1.16** 
(0.00) 
0.36** 
(0.00) 
0.89** 
(0.00) 
SD of the Random Intercepts 
Households 0.64 0.58 0.67 0.75 0.60 0.46 
Cutpoints       
1 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.86 
2 2.42 2.47 2.47 2.50 2.43 2.35 
N (households, 
individuals) 
1385, 
2236 
1339, 
2083 
1339, 
2101 
1211, 
1739 
1385, 
2231 
677, 
785 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the probabilities of the parameter having the opposite 
sign; coefficients are marked with * if the probability is less than 0.05, ** if less than 0.01. 
 26 
 
supported. While revenue neutrality makes environmental protection much more 
appealing to the public, political cynicism appears to reduce the positive effects of 
framing new environmental taxes as such. Considering the relatively minor difference 
in the wording between versions H and J, the magnitude of the impact on the 
responses is surprisingly large.22 
Models 4 through 8 in Table 3 are similar to Model 3, except that each one 
includes a series of interaction effects. In each model, one attitudinal covariate is 
interacted with each of the randomly assigned treatments. For each model, then, the 
first six rows in Table 3 present the effect of the treatment on the reference category: 
people who do not believe in climate change, who subscribe to economically liberal 
ideology, who are politically trusting, who are uninterested in politics, and who feel 
closest to the Labour Party, respectively. The next coefficient, in each model, 
indicates the difference between people holding the alternative and reference values 
for these attitudinal covariates—belief in climate change, etc. Then the next six 
coefficients capture the difference between the randomly assigned treatments’ effect 
on people with the alternative and reference values for each of these attitudinal 
covariates. In other words, each of these models treats a different kind of person as 
the baseline against which another kind of person is compared, in order to test 
whether the effects of the treatments differ significantly across the two types. 
 As in Table 2 above, belief in climate change, subscribing to left/anti-liberal 
political ideology, being politically trusting, and being interested in politics all predict 																																																								
22 Note that H and J describe scenarios where total revenues stay the same, but spending 
increases. The result by implication will be a net deficit, which could be confusing to 
respondents, motivating them to be more sceptical. One reviewer suggested that the 
difference between the responses under scenario J compared to H could therefore be due to an 
“attention” rather than “trust” effect, with the reference to a government promise motivating 
people to think harder about the implied deficit. It is not clear, however, why a promise would 
enhance people’s attentiveness unless they believed the promise/r to be untrustworthy. 
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more willingness to pay. The difference between Labour and Conservative voters is, 
on the other hand, marginal; there is even a 15% chance that Conservatives are more 
willing to pay. The important question to be asked of Models 5 through 8, however, is 
whether the effects of the various randomly assigned treatments differ substantially 
across different types of people. At first glance, the answer is generally that they do 
not, insofar as only one interaction effect is statistically significant, in Model 5. 
In Model 6, unlike in the other models, the probability that the effect of Offset 
: Promised is negative is less than 95% for people in the reference category (not 
politically cynical). Yet the effect of this treatment is not much different for people 
who are politically cynical, judging by the coefficient on the interaction effect Cynical 
: Offset : Promised, which is estimated to be negative, but has a 35% chance of 
actually being positive. The fact that the effect of Promised is smaller for people who 
are not politically cynical reflects logically that they are less sceptical about 
politicians keeping their promises, as does the negative sign on the triple-interaction.23 
Since interpreting such interaction effects and the uncertainties about them is 
challenging, and to provide a sense of the magnitudes of all the effects, Figure 1 
presents the expected responses by different types of people under six of the ten 
randomly assigned scenarios. The expected proportions, of respondents who are at 
least fairly willing to pay new environmental taxes, are derived from the models 
appearing in Table 3. The six panels present the results for Britons as a whole in the 
top-left and contrasting types of people in the other panels, where the contrasts are 
between people with the minimal and maximal values for each variable. 
Out of all the different types of people presented in Figure 1, climate sceptics 
(who are a small minority) are clearly the most hostile to proposals for new 																																																								
23 Fitting the models with just DCRKD (rather than the summative index for cynicism also 
including LDSMRT) produced substantively similar results. 
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environmental taxes: almost none are willing to pay for new taxes in the base 
scenario. Yet even climate sceptics respond positively to revenue-neutrality, and 
indeed they respond to all the treatments in much the same ways as people who do 
believe in climate science. It would seem then that even people who are not very 
convinced about the seriousness of environmental problems can, to a degree, be won 
over. 
 
Figure 1: Modelled Probabilities of Being Willing to Pay Higher Taxes to Protect 
the Environment, by Experimental Condition 
 
Note: Expected proportions of various types of respondents being at least fairly 
willing to pay higher taxes in order to protect the environment, under six different 
scenarios (A, C, E, G, B, and J from Table 2, in order from left to right), derived from 
Models 3 through 8. The vertical lines represent 95% Bayesian credible intervals. 
 
In the rest of the panels, the pairs of groups are less divided. People 
subscribing to right/liberal economic views are not much different from those 
subscribing to left views, suggesting that at least in Britain there is no great political 
divide with respect to willingness to pay new environmental taxes. These two groups 
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also respond similarly to most of the various randomly assigned treatments, though 
their responses differ somewhat to the Things You Buy and Offset : Promised 
scenarios.24 
Two greater divides, which appear in the next two panels, are instead between 
the cynical and the non-cynical and between the politically interested and 
uninterested.25 The politically interested and uninterested respond very similarly to 
the different treatments, while cynics and non-cynics are distinct in their responses to 
some treatments. As noted earlier in the discussion of Model 6, while the effect of 
Promised differs for respondents who report different background levels of political 
cynicism, the difference is not statistically significant. And Figure 1 makes clear that 
even people who report the lowest baseline levels of background cynicism are still 
somewhat sceptical of government promises—even if they are not as sceptical as 
cynics.26 
There is also little distinction between people who feel closest to the 
Conservative party and those who feel closest to Labour. If anything, Conservatives 
(who might seem more sanguine about the honesty of people in government, since the 
British government was being run at the time of the survey by the Conservatives) 
evidence a more negative response to government promises. So it would seem that 
partisanship has little impact. 
																																																								
24 The divide between people with left and right/liberal views under the sixth scenario here 
reflects the large effect of Promised—alone, not interacted with Offset—for people on the left 
(see Model 5 in Table 3). The source of this effect has no obvious theoretical rationale or 
interpretation. There are many relationships being investigated with the models in Table 3, 
such that this finding may simply be a consequence of making multiple comparisons. I would 
not want to draw any strong conclusions on the basis of this or other isolated statistically 
significant coefficients. Overall, the results suggest that the effects of the treatments are 
strongly consistent across different kinds of people, not notably variable. 
25 Political cynicism and interest correlate, but not strongly (G = -0.20). 
26 The difference between scenarios H and J is statistically significant for cynics, but not for 
non-cynics. 
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In sum, every type of respondent is most willing to pay new environmental 
taxes where the new taxes are offset by tax reductions elsewhere. Every type is also 
however less willing where offsetting cuts to other taxes are only a government 
promise, rather than a fact. That framing revenue-neutrality as a government promise 
rather than a fact has such a marked effect suggests that few people regard 
government promises as credible. This result appears to validate the importance of the 
specific form of political distrust that is political cynicism. 
 There are two caveats about this finding, however. First, the number of 
respondents being compared here is modest—441, as shown in Appendix D. 
Nevertheless, a direct test of the statistical significance of the difference between the 
responses under conditions J and H shows that the difference is indeed significant. 
Second, it is a limitation of the experimental design that there is no condition under 
which just revenue-neutrality, not hypothecation, is a government promise. The 
difference between the responses under conditions H and J could be due merely to the 
greater complexity of the latter. Yet the difference between the two question versions 
is not large—J is just three words and 17 characters longer. There are then some 
reasons to remain circumspect about the evidence for a causal relationship, but not 
especially strong reasons. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The survey experiments described in this article suggest reasons why the 
public is so often hostile to what policy experts generally consider the most effective 
means of protecting the natural environment. Consistent with results from qualitative 
focus groups, the public’s hostility to environmental taxation appears to be due in 
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large part to political distrust; people want new green taxes introduced in tandem with 
offsetting cuts to other taxes, but they do not believe governments when they promise 
to make such cuts (Green Fiscal Commission 2009; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, and 
Whitmarsh 2007). Even in positive cases outside Britain, where a substantial new 
environmental tax has proven politically sustainable and the public has been 
accepting, there has been substantial scepticism about revenue neutrality (as for 
example in the case of British Columbia—see Harrison 2012.) 
Further research would benefit from exploring how the relationship between 
political trust and willingness to pay environmental taxes may differ across different 
kinds of political/cultural contexts—such as low rather than high-trust societies. 
Britain is middling in this regard, among high-income nations. Especially given the 
hugely U.S.-focused character of the literature, we need more systematic comparisons 
of cross-national differences. More broadly, we also need to know more about the 
effects of different kinds of framing, and how such framing relates to attitudes 
towards taxation generally. 
If the results here have pointed to revenue neutrality as a potentially useful 
tool for making environmental taxes more acceptable to the public, the findings about 
the effects of hypothecation are more cautionary. Given that a number of other studies 
have found positive effects of earmarking green tax revenues for spending on 
environmental protection, it may be that the question wording used here was too 
vague. Other studies have investigated the impact of naming very specific forms of 
environmental protection to which revenues could be devoted; perhaps such 
specificity is important. Future experiments could investigate this possibility as well. 
  More broadly, this study implies a need for some shift in emphasis in existing 
definitions of political trust. Most of the literature on the consequences for public 
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opinion defines political trust as people’s satisfaction with government performance. 
That definition de-emphasises the importance of honesty and truthfulness and 
people’s perceptions of whether politicians and public administrations possess these 
kinds of integrity. The experiments here show that most Britons do not trust their 
government to do what it says. Supporters of the governing party, who are 
presumably more satisfied with the government’s actions, are just as sceptical as 
supporters of the opposition. Expectations about promise-keeping, not just satisfaction 
with performance, can therefore shape public opinion about public policies. With 
respect to environmental taxes specifically, even if the public were more satisfied 
with government performance, that would not appear to be enough to build greater 
public acceptance. Instead, the results presented here suggest that advocates of green 
taxation would still need to overcome a deficit of public confidence in the 
trustworthiness of government promises. 
Finally, the results presented in this paper suggest that conventional measures 
of political trust do not perform as well as researchers might hope. Survey questions 
used to capture cynicism—itself only one facet of political trust—are not working to 
capture all of people’s cynicism. Even people who do not appear to be cynical, 
judging by the conventional measures, evidence substantial cynicism when revealing 
their true feelings about government promises. 
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Appendix A 
 
A. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes in order to protect the 
environment? 
B. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes in order to protect the 
environment, if the government reduced other taxes you pay by the same 
amount? 
C. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes on things you buy that pollute 
the environment? 
D. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes on things you buy that pollute 
the environment, if the government reduced other taxes you pay by the same 
amount? 
E. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes on things you buy that pollute 
the environment, like petrol or electricity? 
F. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes on things you buy that pollute 
the environment, like petrol or electricity, if the government reduced other 
taxes you pay by the same amount? 
G. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes, if the government spent the 
extra money on protecting the environment? 
H. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes, if the government spent the 
extra money on protecting the environment and reduced other taxes you pay 
by the same amount? 
I. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes, if the government promised it 
would spend the extra money on protecting the environment? 
J. How willing would you be to pay higher taxes, if the government promised it 
would spend the extra money on protecting the environment and reduce other 
taxes you pay by the same amount? 
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Table B1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Min Max Unique Valid SD 
Age (years-16) 34.21 0 80 80 2413 18.17 
Education       
Degree (reference) 0.25 0 1 2 2400  
Other higher degree 0.14 0 1 2 2400  
A-level etc. 0.22 0 1 2 2400  
GCSE etc. 0.24 0 1 2 2400  
Other qualification 0.07 0 1 2 2400  
No qualification 0.08 0 1 2 2400  
Party Identification       
Conservative 0.40 0 1 2 1099  
Labour 0.42 0 1 2 1099  
Other 0.18 0 1 2 1099  
Income 2.20 0 16.67 1356 2326 1.31 
Male 0.46 0 1 2 2413 0.50 
Rural 0.23 0 1 2 2413 0.42 
Political Distrust 0.71 0 1 5 1788 0.32 
LDSMRT 0.24 0 1 2 1988 0.43 
DCRKD 1.30 0 2 3 1953 0.73 
Belief in Climate Change 0.80 0 1 5 2141 0.26 
G_OPECL30 0.85 0 1 2 2231 0.36 
GW 1.48 0 2 3 2231 0.61 
Left Ideology 0.63 0 1 3 2166 0.38 
ADQHOUS 0.66 0 1 2 2190 0.47 
JOBS 0.60 0 1 2 2220 0.49 
Interest in Politics 1.34 0 3 4 2325 0.93 
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Table C1: Model with Treatment Dummies 
Fixed Effects  
Treatment B 1.15** 
(0.00) 
Treatment C 0.16 
(0.11) 
Treatment D 1.13** 
(0.00) 
Treatment E -0.11 
(0.19) 
Treatment F 0.76** 
(0.00) 
Treatment G 0.05 
(0.37) 
Treatment H 0.84** 
(0.00) 
Treatment I 0.12 
(0.17) 
Treatment J 0.45** 
(`0.00) 
(Intercept) 0.61** 
(0.00) 
SD of the Random Intercepts  
Households 0.64 
Cutpoints  
1 0.97 
2 2.43 
N (households, individuals) 1385, 2236 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the modelled 
probabilities of the parameter having the 
opposite sign; coefficients are marked with * if 
the probability is less than 0.05, ** if less than 
0.01. 
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Table D1: Model contrasting Scenarios H and J 
Fixed Effects  
Treatment J -0.37** 
(0.01) 
(Intercept) 1.35** 
(0.00) 
SD of the Random Intercepts  
Households 0.75 
Cutpoints  
1 0.85 
2 2.30 
N (households, individuals) 275, 441 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the modelled 
probabilities of the parameter having the opposite 
sign; coefficients are marked with * if the 
probability is less than 0.05, ** if less than 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
Table D2: Raw Counts of Responses in Scenarios H and J 
Treatment 
Group 
Not at 
all 
willing 
Not 
very 
willing 
Fairly 
willing 
Very 
willing 
Total 
Valid 
N 
H 30 46 97 49 222 
J 50 53 84 32 219 
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Table E1: Means and Standard Deviations of Covariates by Treatment Group 
  A B C D E F G H I J 
Age (years-16) 34.77  36.98  31.01  33.59  33.95  33.73  34.91  33.06  35.52  34.99  
(17.36) (19.11) (19.26) (17.79) (17.45) (18.02) (18.51) (16.32) (19.14) (18.32) 
Education           
Degree (reference) 0.24  0.24  0.28  0.29  0.26  0.24  0.23  0.24  0.22  0.20  
(0.43) (0.43) (0.45) (0.46) (0.44) (0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.41) (0.40) 
Other higher degree 0.11  0.12  0.12  0.11  0.12  0.16  0.19  0.13  0.14  0.16  
(0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) (0.37) (0.39) (0.34) (0.35) (0.37) 
A-level etc. 0.22  0.22  0.22  0.21  0.19  0.25  0.19  0.21  0.22  0.25  
(0.42) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.39) (0.43) (0.39) (0.41) (0.42) (0.44) 
GCSE etc. 0.25  0.23  0.27  0.21  0.26  0.23  0.25  0.27  0.24  0.23  
(0.44) (0.42) (0.45) (0.41) (0.44) (0.42) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.42) 
Other qualification 0.10  0.08  0.04  0.08  0.07  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.07  
(0.30) (0.27) (0.20) (0.27) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) (0.25) (0.27) (0.26) 
No qualification 0.07  0.11  0.06  0.09  0.10  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.10  0.10  
(0.26) (0.31) (0.24) (0.28) (0.30) (0.25) (0.27) (0.27) (0.30) (0.29) 
Party Identification           
Conservative 0.35  0.42  0.45  0.35  0.42  0.34  0.40  0.34  0.55  0.34  
(0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.47) 
Labour 0.50  0.37  0.38  0.43  0.37  0.44  0.47  0.42  0.28  0.55  
(0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.45) (0.50) 
Other 0.15  0.21  0.18  0.22  0.20  0.21  0.14  0.24  0.17  0.12  
(0.36) (0.41) (0.38) (0.42) (0.40) (0.41) (0.34) (0.43) (0.38) (0.32) 
Income 2.05  2.21  2.13  2.31  2.16  2.27  2.25  2.43  2.29  1.93  
(1.02) (1.10) (1.24) (1.32) (1.25) (1.42) (1.38) (1.50) (1.68) (1.09) 
Male 0.42  0.45  0.47  0.43  0.45  0.44  0.48  0.49  0.48  0.46  
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Rural 0.26  0.29  0.22  0.18  0.20  0.19  0.20  0.31  0.22  0.22  
(0.44) (0.45) (0.41) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.46) (0.41) (0.41) 
Political Distrust 0.73  0.73  0.67  0.68  0.73  0.72  0.70  0.71  0.71  0.71  
(0.32) (0.32) (0.35) (0.34) (0.28) (0.32) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.32) 
LDSMRT 0.24  0.23  0.29  0.27  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.24  0.26  0.25  
(0.43) (0.42) (0.46) (0.45) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42) (0.43) (0.44) (0.43) 
DCRKD 1.34  1.34  1.22  1.24  1.34  1.32  1.20  1.33  1.31  1.32  
(0.73) (0.72) (0.76) (0.78) (0.70) (0.72) (0.74) (0.73) (0.72) (0.75) 
Belief in Climate Change 0.76  0.84  0.79  0.81  0.77  0.82  0.80  0.81  0.76  0.79  
(0.29) (0.22) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) 
G_OPECL30 0.81  0.89  0.83  0.86  0.83  0.89  0.85  0.86  0.81  0.86  
(0.40) (0.31) (0.38) (0.35) (0.38) (0.32) (0.36) (0.35) (0.40) (0.35) 
GW 1.45  1.54  1.47  1.53  1.42  1.51  1.49  1.53  1.40  1.44  
(0.63) (0.62) (0.60) (0.62) (0.62) (0.59) (0.63) (0.60) (0.62) (0.60) 
Left Ideology 0.64  0.59  0.58  0.66  0.62  0.64  0.64  0.60  0.65  0.66  
(0.38) (0.39) (0.40) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) 
ADQHOUS 0.65  0.61  0.60  0.71  0.64  0.68  0.68  0.63  0.70  0.68  
(0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.46) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.49) (0.46) (0.47) 
JOBS 0.64  0.58  0.57  0.61  0.59  0.61  0.59  0.58  0.59  0.65  
(0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) 
Interest in Politics 1.19  1.32  1.42  1.38  1.19  1.41  1.47  1.37  1.36  1.32  
(0.97) (0.92) (0.89) (0.87) (0.93) (0.96) (0.92) (0.90) (0.95) (0.92) 
 
